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OBSERVATIONS ON THE ATTEMPT TO COMMIT BURGLARY
In the recent case of People v. Glickman,
377 IML 360 (1941), a defendant was in-
dicted for burglary and found guilty of an
attempt to commit burglary by the trial
court but the Supreme Court reversed the
finding.
In Illinois there are three layers of law
relating to the crime of attempted burg-
larys (1) the common law; (2) the statu-
tory crime of attempted burglary in the
nighttime (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38,
par. 85); and (3) the statutory catch-all
criminal attempt where no express provi-
sion is made by law for the punishment of
such attempt (IlL Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38,
par. 581). Are these three layers mutually-
exclusive? The question is raised in light
of the fact that the Supreme Court in the
principal case ruled that a defendant in-
dicted for burglary that neither speci-
fied daytime or nighttime, could not be
found guilty of an attempt to commit that
crime.
In the instant case the accused was in
the business of selling kink-proof cord in
offices and apartments. The manager of a
hotel on North Dearborn Street in Chi-
cago discovered the defendant on the
eighth floor near the suite of the manager
and thereupon detained the defendant.
The manager claimed his rooms had been
entered and that the defendant told him
he was in the room repairing a faucet but
this the defendant denied. These brief
facts will be sufficient for this note that is
primarily concerned with the law of the
case.
Besides the three layers of law relating
to the criminal attempt to commit burg-
lary there is another very important rule
that might be identified as a fourth layer.
That rule is the one that holds a defendant
indicted for a projected crime can be found
guilty of an attempt to commit that crime
if the evidence does not sustain a finding
of guilty for the projected crime. For ex-
ample, a defendant indicted for the crime
of rape has been held guilty of an attempt
to commit rape. Reynold v. People, 83 Ill.
479. The decision of the lower court in the
Glickman case would seem to fall within
this rule.
In the face of the ruling of the Supreme
'Court in the principal case the State's At-
torney faces difficulty in the burglary cases.
The court referring to the catch-all gen-
eral attempt provision found in par. 581
of the Criminal Code and mentioned above
as the third layer of attempt law in Illi-
nois, said: "This section applies only
'where no express provision is made by
law for the punishment of such attempt.'
Although the word 'burglary' is not men-
tioned therein, there is such an express
provision defining and punishing attempted
burglary (the court should have added in
the nighttime), and, therefore, the general
statute relied on by the People does not
apply." The court seems to say since par.
85, or the second layer of law as mentioned
in the beginning of this note, provides for
an attempt to commit burglary in the
nighttime, the lower court improperly
found the defendant guilty of an attempt
to commit burglary upon an indictment
for burglary that did not contain an allega-
tion that the burglary was in the nighttime.
The court says: "The indictment in the
case before us does not contain the essen-
tial allegation that the attempt for which
the defendant was found guilty was com-
mitted in the nighttime . . . this indict-
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ment and proof will not support that judg-
ment." Why should the court insist upon
the People using and being limited by par.
85, or the second layer of attempt-law as
classified in this note? Why is it unsound
to let the People fall back on (1) the com-
mon law layer of criminal attempt, or the
(3) third layer of criminal attempt law as
referred to above, viz., par. 581, the gen-
eral catch-all criminal attempt provision.
The court when requested to recognize the
rule mentioned above as the fourth layer
of criminal-attempt law, viz., the law that
holds that when an indictment for a higher
crime embraces all the elements of an of-
fense of an inferior degree, the defendant
may be acquitted of the greater crime and
convicted of the lesser if the evidence justi-
fies it, was of the opinion that this case did
not come within that principle. That con-
clusion seems doubtful. In this case the
defendant was indicted for burglary but
the evidence did not sustain burglary.
Surely it is impossible to deny that the evi-
dence did show an attempt to commit
burglary and therefore the view of the
lower court should have been upheld on
that ground as there are different types of
attempts to commit burglary . . . the
common law recognized various types and
the statutory general attempt likewise rec-
ognized various types. But the Supreme
Court only would recognize the "night-
time" type of attempted burglary as being
within the ambit of the principal case.
That is a dangerous construction as it pre-
vents the People from successfully prose-
cuting the burglar who plys his trade in
the daytime but fails to burglarize yet dis-
turbs the public peace by his criminal con-
duct.
Because the Legislature of Illinois
enacted a general criminal attempt catch-
all (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38, par. 581)
provision and also enacted a specific type
of attempted burglary in the night time
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38, par. 85) it
does not follow that the specific provision
in par. 85 is exclusive or that it should be
exclusively related to the indictment for
the completed crime where the burglary
projected fails and the conduct amounts
only to an attempt to commit burglary. Is
it not reasonable to conclude that the
Legislature intended the catch-all attempt
provision to be available at all times?
In conclusion it should be noted that it
might be claimed that the decision in the
instant case means only that the People
must use the second layer of attempt law,
viz., par. 85 of the Criminal Code above
mentioned when the burglary attempt was
in the nighttime. When the attempt is in
the daytime the People must use the third
layer of attempt law, viz., par. 581, pre-
viously mentioned. If this is the result of
the Glickman decision then it is bound to
be a great boon to defense lawyers because
the philosophical disquisitions on the
meaning of "nighttime" and "daytime"
and "dusk" are most confounding. One re-
calls in this respect the cases that held it
was not embezzlement because it was lar-
ceny and it was not larceny because it
was embezzlement. So here, it would not
be "nighttime" because it was "daytime"
and it would be neither "nighttime" nor
"daytime" because it was "dusk." By rec-
ognizing in burglary cases of this type,
(1) the common law, (2) the general at-
tempt provision of the Criminal Code, par.
581, (3) the specific provision relating to
attempted burglary in the nighttime, and
(4) the rule that recognizes a defendant
can be held guilty of an attempt if he fails
to perfect the projected crime, the difficulty
arising if cases similar to the Glickman
would be avoided, as (1), (2), (3), (4),
are not mutually exclusive as each are like
a finger on the hand stemming from a com-
mon source and available to attain a com-
mon end by either individual or united
action. The People should be able to use
any or all of the rules in order to prevent
a defendant who is guilty of criminal con-





HOW DOES COMPULSION OF STATUTE AFFECT THE USE OF
VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPORTS AS EVIDENCE?
Tke time honored rule as to self incrimi-
n tion requires that no person in any crim-
.hal case can be compelled to witness
against himself. The recent decision of the
Canadian Supreme Court in the case of
Rex. v. Walker' constitutes an interpreta-
tion of the rule that may be of exceptional
significance in the field of traffic accident
reduction.
On the night of July 16, 1937, a motor
car was proceeding down hill near the vil-
lage. of Wyebridge, Ontario. The driver
skidded into a ditch. Several persons died
as a result of injuries. When the constable
interrogated Walker, he stated that one
George was the driver. Later, Walker ad-
mitted that he was the driver. He was
charged with manslaughter. The prosecu-
tion placed the constable on the stand to
testify as to Walker's admission. The judge
refused to permit the testimony on the
ground that Walker was required to supply
information under compulsion of statute.
Since the statement was not voluntary, it
violated the common law rule. In conse-
quence, the case was withdrawn from the
jury in the absence of other evidence iden-
tifying Walker as the driver.
The Supreme Court reversed the deci-
sion of the lower court and held it was
error to refuse the constable's evidence.
Decision of the higher court hinged upon
an interpretation of several sections of the
Ontario Traffic Law which resemble pro-
visions of many state motor vehicle laws
in the United States. Briefed, Section 4J
of the Ontario Act, requires that in the
event of accident, the driver shall remain
at the scene and upon request supply in-
formation as to his name, address, etc. It
was by virtue of this that the constable
secured Walker's admissions. Another sec-
tion (No. 88) requires that the driver in-
volved in an accident submit a report to
proper authorities. But such report cannot
be used as evidence in any case arising out
of said accident.
The issue was therefore raised: did that
part of Section 88 prohibiting use of re-
port as evidence constitute a limitation or
restriction on Section 40? Said the court:
"There is no rule of law that statements
made by an accused under cbmpulsion of
statute are, because of such compulsion
alone, inadmissible against him in criminal
proceedings. Generally speaking, such
statements are admissible unless they fall
within the scope of some specific enactment
or rule excluding- them." Since Section 40
contained no excluding rule, the court held
that information obtained by virtue of it
was admissible. Similar interpretations
relative to state motor vehicle codes would
open the way to the introduction of evi-
dence of exceptional value to enforcement
officials.
DAVID G. MoNmoE,
N. U. Traffic Institute.
70 C.C.C. 240.
